Similar stories are told elsewhere in the literature.5 ' This fable of commercial prosperity and international integration through free trade has seemed so compelling that it has become the fundamental motivation of an entire branch of the political science literature through the theory of hegemonic stability (Gilpin, Political Economy; Keohane, After Hegemony). The hypothesis is, in brief, that international free trade is a public good requiring a powerful leader, or hegemon, to become established. In the absence of a dominant Britain, prisoner's dilemma problems would prevent states from moving toward free trade. Britain's unique and unilateral shift to free trade is therefore a necessary if not quite sufficient condition for the integrated European market that developed late in the nineteenth century. In another essay, I consider the implications of my findings for the literature on commercial policy and international relations (Nye, "Revisionist Tariff History"). 4 Bairoch, "European Trade Policy," p. 6. The scholar who did most to enlighten us about the details of changing trade policy in the French Second Empire did not himself seem to perceive how open French trade had become even before the 1860 Cobden-Chevalier treaty. Dunham underestimated the efforts of Napoleon III when he wrote in reference to the treaty that "On the side of England it marked the practical completion of the adoption of free trade which had been begun by Huskisson nearly forty years before, whereas on the side of France it was only the first decisive step in a reduction which was not desired to go beyond the limits of moderate protection" (Dunham, The Anglo-French Treaty, p. 1).
But an examination of British and French commercial statistics suggests that the conventional wisdom is simply wrong. There is little evidence that Britain's trade was substantially more open than that of France. Very little of the existing work on British or French trade has taken a comparative perspective, and there has been little economic as opposed to political analysis of the commercial interaction between nations. Most of the economic work has focused on the volume of trade in the two nations and has taken the changing tariffs for granted as an interesting stylized fact.
When the comparison is made, the trade figures suggest that France's trade regime was more liberal than that of Great Britain throughout most of the nineteenth century, even in the period from 1840 to 1860. This is when France was said to have been struggling against her legacy of protection while Britain had already made the decision to move unilaterally to freer trade. Although some have recognized that Napoleon 1II had begun to liberalize France's trade regime even before the 1860 treaty of commerce, both current and contemporaneous accounts treat the period before the 1860s as a protectionist one in France and a relatively free one in Britain.
A straightforward examination of the raw numbers immediately alerts us that something is amiss in the fable. Table 1 Napoleon tried in the 1850s to reduce the strongly protectionist stance of French policy, but because of opposition in the legislature he was unable to carry through a thorough reform of tariff policy. . . . The thought in Britain at this time, after its move to free trade, was that the advantages of a free trade policy would be so obvious that other countries would adopt it spontaneously. Because of the strength of protectionist interests, however, this was not the case. Accordingly, a treaty negotiated by Cobden and Chevalier late in 1859 was signed in January 1860.
The treaty provided that Britain would remove all tariffs on imports of French goods with the exception of wine and brandy. These were considered luxury products for British consumers, so Britain retained a small tariff for revenue only.. . . France, for its part [with the 1860 treaty] removed its prohibitions on the importations of British textiles and reduced tariffs on a wide range of British goods to a maximum of 30 percent; in fact, the average tariff was about 15 percent ad valorem. The French thus gave up extreme protectionism in favor of a moderate protectionism (Cameron, A Concise Economic History, p. 276). Calculations of average tariff rates based on the ratio of total tariff revenues to total importables require some qualification. For instance, the tariff level may be set so high that certain items that might otherwise be imported in large amounts enter fitfully or not at all.8 In the case of outright prohibitions, consumers are implicitly paying a tariff equal to the difference (at most) between the home price of the domestically produced good and its foreign equivalent. Adjustments need to be made to get more comparable British and French tariff statistics.
In short, we have a classic index-number problem, complicated by the lack of a unique and well-accepted index of the degree of openness of a nation's trade. If one nation had had lower tariffs on every single 6 The use of average tariff levels as a basis from which to denote the size and timing of the move to free trade is standard in the literature. Both Imlah's classic discussion and McCloskey's employ some version of tariff revenues as a percentage of importables to indicate how free British trade was (Imlah, Economic Elements; McCloskey, "Magnanimous Albion"). 7 The British figures are not entirely reliable before the 1820s (and indeed before the 1840s) due to the inappropriate valuations of the commodities imported and exported. An extensive reworking of the trade statistics was produced by Imlah based on the work of Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz and has remained the basis for all further research, though Davis expanded further on the commodity series (Imlah, Economic Elements; Davis, The Industrial Revolution). 8 In Bairoch, a table of comparative tariff levels for Western Europe does not list that of France given the prohibitions on many items ("European Trade Policy," table 3, p. 6). However, the items primarily affected-manufactures-were never that large a share of imports. As I demonstrate, it is possible to take some crude account of the effects of those prohibitions by examining import shares in the later periods of very low tariffs and no prohibitions. item of trade than the other, it would be easy to state categorically that it had the more liberal trading structure.9 The inequality is not so simple, of course. Yet we do not need precise average tariff rates to see that British tariffs were not uniformly or even "generally" below those of France for most of the century.
Even without making adjustments, we can see that certain parts of the argument are robust to these respecifications. First, one would expect the following to be true: if items that were prohibited prior to the policy changes in the late 1850s and 1860s were then permitted to enter at some positive tariff, it might well be the case that the average tariff levels after prohibitions were removed would increase, given the new import composition. For instance most cotton textiles, which were banned prior to the 1860 treaty, were imported in fairly large quantities after the treaty at a tariff rate (20 to 30 percent) higher than the overall average. But if this meant that average tariff levels prior to the Second Empire would need to be adjusted to take this prohibition into account, the size of the drop in average tariff levels during the period from 1852 to 1870 is underestimated by the unadjusted average tariff rates, because earlier all-commodity averages would be too low. Given the already low tariff levels of the 1860s, full information about the appropriate corrections would only serve to underline the openness of Napoleon Ill's France and the magnitude of the change in tariffs from the early 1840s to the fall of the Second Empire.
A substantial share of French imports was duty free and, though prohibitions may have distorted this figure in the first half of the nineteenth century, the proportion of duty-free items did not change much and even grew in the period when prohibitions were replaced with tariffs.10 This runs counter to the intuition that the existence of prohibitions masked the true extent of protection by biasing the fraction of duty-free imports upward relative to the years of freer trade. Table 2 shows that the proportion of French imports by value that were duty free stood at around 61 percent in 1849 and increased to 65 percent by 1869. What is remarkable is the stability of the shares of dutiable and duty-free items in value terms through periods of widely varying tariff levels and trade restrictions. Thus, with only a third of all imports being dutiable even in the period when moderate tariffs replaced all prohibi-9 One possible index compares tariff revenues in Britain and France using each other's tariff rates. If Britain were clearly more open than France, French tariff revenues would decline using British rates and British revenues would increase using French tariffs. However, calculations for the period from 1847 to 1856 indicate that both countries' revenues decrease when the other's tariff rates are applied. This is not surprising, given the later discussion in this paper. Contrary to the precepts of international trade, Britain and France tended to levy duties on items on which they did not have a comparative advantage, which partially explains the results of this index.
0 The other officially protected commodity was colonial sugar. Both colonial and foreign sugar were taxed at high rates, though the latter paid much higher duties than the former. As we will see later, the sugar tariffs did play an important role in the overall tariff levels for both countries. One way of adjusting the average duties to take some account of the problems mentioned earlier is to apply the tariff rates by commodity class to the import distribution of another period. Using an estimate of the "true" import shares in free trade adjusts for the fact that high tariffs in certain periods may lead to too small a share of imports. In this case, using the import composition of a period characterized by nearly free trade (France in the late 1860s or Britain in the 1880s) serves as the basis for more reliable index-number comparisons. In addition, I test for the sensitivity of my French figures to the large swings in import composition and tariff rates by applying the rates in every period to the import shares in every other period. As it turns out, these calculations have the advantage of permitting easy comparison with tariff calculations already available in the literature.
In his well-known essay on free trade and British national income, Donald McCloskey examined the sensitivity of changing tariff levels to changing import demand by recalculating British tariff levels for 1841, 1854, and 1881 using the commodity weights of each of the different years." I reprint the results of his calculations as Table 3 because it is worth using his numbers as benchmarks. His alternative calculations of the tariff rates alter several of the figures by as much as five to ten percentage points. Nonetheless, the magnitude of the absolute change in tariffs seems fairly constant. The large hypothetical changes produced by using different commodity weights are partly attributable to the coverage of British tariffs throughout most of the century. The large duty-free component of French goods would make French tariff levels still more insensitive to changes in composition. Table 4 Note how robust the French figures are to fairly substantial respecification. In no case do the average tariffs increase by more than two to four percentage points. The numbers used in calculations were selected to bias the results upward. To deal with the problem of prohibitions on textiles, I assumed the effective tariff to be 50 percent. This figure was derived from the comparative prices on cotton yarn for the period from 1825 to 1864 calculated by Patrick O'Brien and Caglar Keyder, using an exchange rate of 25 francs to the pound. 14 O'Brien and Keyder's figures show cotton yarn in France to be some 30 to 40 percent higher than in Britain during this period, so 50 percent would seem to be a reasonable upper bound. This number is consistent with the writings of even the most fervent French protectionists who argued that a rate of 40+ percent, consistently applied, would have been sufficient to defend existing producers against foreign competition.'5 Most of the textiles excluded had fairly elastic demands and therefore faced much smaller effective tariffs.'6 No easily comparable price series are available for wool, but woolen textile prices did not seem to be systematically higher in France than in Britain. Jean Marczewski's numbers even show a lower average price for raw wool in France than in Britain throughout the century.'7 At any rate, using the 50 percent markup from cotton yarn for wool is certainly an overestimate. Besides my using a high tariff rate in these cases, combining the import composition of the 1860s and 1870s with the tariff rates for the earlier periods ignores any changes in income or responses to lowered textile prices that would have increased consumption of such products (so long as they could be imported), thus 14 Therefore, even accepting that this cost per spindle fully represented differences in the marginal costs in both industries and taking the above as a high upper bound, it seems that a tariff of 50 percent strictly applied would have served to maintain existing rents of the protected industries even if transportation costs were ignored. These figures were subsequently challenged by various officials and some observers maintained that no such difference existed at all (Fohlen, L'Industrie textile, 1956). Nye tending to overstate the weight of textiles in the recalculations. Any further adjustments made in the direction of more reasonable assumptions would only serve to confirm that French tariff levels averaged 10 to 15 percent for the 1840s and 1850s and 4 to 8 percent for the 1860s and 1870s.
In the light of the high duty-free component of French trade, it should not be surprising that the French tariff averages are robust to changes in the markup assumed for textiles. Furthermore, large increases in many items do not change their representation in dutiable goods, because overall imports rose in most categories.'8 If French average trade levels were lower than, and at worst comparable to, those of Great Britain for virtually the whole of the nineteenth century and particularly for the first part of the century and for the late Second Empire, how can such a pattern have been ignored for so long? Many conjectures are possible; I will confine myself to the most obvious.
Trade formed a much larger proportion of British production than it did in France for most of the century. This fact, coupled with the much larger absolute level of total British trade, was bound to make British trade policy seem more important to the world at large. 9 Given the high starting level of British tariffs, the steady and ultimately dramatic drop in the average level of British tariffs would have seemed doubly impressive to outside observers focusing on government action that affected very large volumes of trade. In contrast, much of France's commerce was internal and, to the extent that the economy developed or was retarded, was more seriously affected by domestic economic developments than by trade policy. Tariff reform was a prominent accomplishment of Napoleon 111, but it was only one part of a large-scale effort to modernize and stimulate the French economy. Furthermore, and despite discussion that has focused on the exogenous politics of the 1860 treaty, the falling average tariff rates show there were substantial changes in France's overall trading regime even before the treaty came under discussion. Some of those changes were unplanned; others were simply unheralded. Other French reforms in the 8 The tariff averages are fairly insensitive to large changes in the tariff rate I substitute for prohibitions of textile manufactures. Calculations performed using a 100 percent tariff on both cotton and wool do not change Table 3 significantly. Given the data we have on prices and the range of textiles imported. it is unlikely that the true effect of prohibitions on French prices would even have matched the 50 percent figure I employed in the text. Free traders in both England and France were much more concerned with free trade for specific classes of goods they felt were vital to industry than they were with the generalized free trade favored by neoclassical economists. Lucy Brown wrote in her study of the free-Nye trade movement that the free traders were not averse to tariffs of all kinds:
It should be emphasized again that Radical free-traders of this kind expressed no objections to the general principle of deriving a large proportion of the public revenue from import duties. To the regressive character of taxation which leant heavily on duties on tea, coffee, and sugar they were, as has been shown, largely indifferent, perhaps on the grounds that they were not necessities. There is also a final point. None of these duties, except those on timber, which were strongly attacked, and the duty on Swedish iron, were levied on raw materials used in industry, so that they could not be said directly to raise the price of exports. But in criticizing the corn laws a great deal of emphasis was placed on the argument, which was itself based on a subsistence theory of wages, that the corn laws raised wages and therefore indirectly the price of exports. This line of argument could equally well be applied to duties on tea, coffee, and sugar, but it was not used. The reason for this distinction was probably the commonsense one that there is a large degree of difference between the effects on the cost of living of the price of bread and the effects of the price of tea. Altogether then, there was nothing in the Board of Trade in 1840 comparable to the late Victorian propaganda for the "free breakfast table."20
The striking thing about the decadal averages of tariff revenues for France is the high proportion of these "consumption" tariffs for all periods from 1827 to 1876. The large absolute increase in tariffs on wool and cotton products arising from the removal of prohibitions is outweighed by the share of tariff revenues that are accounted for by the main consumption and colonial imports, primarily sugar and coffee. The percentage of total tariff revenues derived from four of the largest consumption items-colonial and foreign sugar, coffee, and olive oilremained at a fairly constant total of about 55 to 60 percent. If anything this percentage total is larger for the latter decades, suggesting that tariff levels and their distribution are not substantially biased by the addition (or previous exclusion) of textile products that are no longer prohibited but enter at some tariff level higher than the overall average. In one sense then, the French prohibitions on cotton and wool textiles and high tariffs on a few other competitive items brand them as protectionist only if one defines protectionism to mean tariffs on a very narrow range of manufactured items. Judged by a broader standard, one that asks how open the nation's trade was rather than how much it consciously sheltered specific industries, nineteenth-century French trade was quite open indeed.
Whether we make this artificial distinction between consumption and protectionist tariffs or not, the French did seem to perceive that a move to free trade meant a more general move by lowering tariffs across the board for consumption items as well as for industrial goods. Lower tariffs on sugar and coffee were prominent components of the emperor's 20 Brown, The Board of Trade, p. 157. stated policy in 1860.21 Such intervention was genuinely liberating in light of the protectionist policies advocated by colonial sugar interests. In particular, the gap between tariff rates on foreign and colonial sugar narrows throughout the century to a point at which the average tariff rate on foreign sugar is actually below that of French colonial sugar in the period of 1867 to 1876 (see Table 7 in the Appendix).
Finally, a careful study of the Appendix shows that though coffee and sugar tariffs were high in both nations, they were somewhat lower for Britain than France from the middle of the century. However, the large imports of tea and wine paying very high tariffs in Britain (usually well over 100 percent), with no dutiable imports of corresponding volume in France, do much to increase the average level of British tariffs.
Ultimately, attempts to distinguish too finely between protectionist and revenue tariffs both change the debate and mislead the observer. Revenue tariffs usually mean those that impose a uniform tax on the consumption of an item having no domestic substitute.22 In contrast, ''protective" tariffs penalize foreign products to benefit local industry. But it is troublesome to read protectionism as limited to tariffs on those items also produced in the home country. The problem with this narrow reading is the basic economic fact that there are substitutes for virtually everything. Raise the tariff on wine and people will drink beer; the tariffs on coffee affect the patterns of tea consumption; and the tariffs on sugar affect not only how the tea will be consumed, but also the foods that the tea will be taken with. One can imagine a continuum of substitutes for most imported products, with declining elasticities of substitution. The neat separation of tariffs into those for "revenue" and "protectionist" purposes is useful in explaining both the public revenue and the political economy aspects of tariffs-why revenue tariffs might be more likely to appear than protectionist ones. But in evaluating a nation's adherence to the principles of free trade and its importance to the economy, we should take care not to confuse the issues.23
Furthermore-the radical free-trader's propaganda aside-most of the remaining British revenue tariffs were strongly protectionist and 21 Thus in his letter of Jan. 5, 1860, to the Minister of State, Napoleon III summed up his economic policy goals as the following: (1) suppression of tariffs on cotton and wool, (2) successive reductions on sugar and coffee, (3) vigorously pursued improvements in transportation routes, (4) reduction in the canal tariffs and then general reductions in the costs of transportation, (5) loans to agriculture and industry, (6) large-scale public works projects, (7) removal of all prohibitions, and (8) commercial treaties with other nations (France, AN F12 2484) . 22 Alternatively, they mean tariffs imposed uniformly on domestic products as well as imports, which was certainly not the case for the British revenue tariffs. 23 In some ways, the question of consumption or revenue tariffs is about the ratio of government tariff revenues to gains to domestic producers from the higher tariff. In the revenue case, this ratio is large (or more accurately, the producer gain is small). However, the long-run elasticity of domestic supply is always greater than the short-run elasticity, ensuring that even a fairly strong "revenue" tariff will become more protectionist in the long run.
were recognized as such by British customs officials. The British Parliamentary Papers document both the extent of British tariffs and prohibitions in the earlier half of the century, and the extent to which the so-called revenue tariffs on wine, spirits, tea, sugar, and tobacco survived throughout the period of "free trade" and were used to protect both domestic and colonial industry.
The British parliamentary report speaks of "the long list of articles which were altogether prohibited to be imported, or could be imported under severe restrictions" lasting virtually unchanged till at least the 1830s, with a few surviving well into the 1860s.24 In certain cases the prohibitions were said to have been holdovers from British rivalry with the Dutch and to reflect the political influence of the East India Company.
Ever since the year 1660, a positive prohibition had existed and been enforced, against the importation from the Netherlands and Germany, in any ships whatever, of wines, spices, groceries, almonds, currants, dates, ginger, liquorice, pepper, raisins, figs, prunes, sugar, tobacco, potashes, pitch, tar, salt, rosin, timer, olive oil and numerous other articles.
Then silk manufactures of every kind, except silk lace were absolutely prohibited to be imported, as also were embroidery, buttons, band strings, cutwork and fringe made of thread, beef, cattle, ground corn (except wheatmeal, wheatflour and oatmeal), mutton, lamb, pork, sheep, swine, malt, foreign fish (with a few exceptions), cards, chocolate, cocoa paste, gloves, thread of copper and brass, manufactured tobacco (except from the plantations of Spain and Portugal, and except snuff), whalebone cut, wines, and woolen cloths. Besides these absolute prohibitions other considerable categories of goods could only be imported by license; others only in a few ports; others only in particular kinds of packages.25 It was the commendable accomplishment of the British government to have simplified its tariff structure and eliminated most of these tariffs and prohibitions in the period from the late 1840s to the 1870s. But such measures were also being undertaken by the French, who attracted less notice (perhaps because they had less need of drastic reform in the first place). Moreover, the British emphasis on removing tariffs on manufactured goods and not on other "non-essential items" has caused us to ignore the protectionist aspects of those duties augmented "upon purely fiscal considerations.'"26 I have already mentioned how wine tariffs must have affected the beer brewers. More significant is the fact that the tariffs on wine and liquor imposed by Britain before the 1860 treaty were levied by volume of wine rather than by alcoholic content or value. This had the effect of favoring Spanish and Portuguese products, in which British merchants had a In the present day, when the duty is levied according to alcoholic strength, it strikes the enquirer as curious that until 1831, French wine, which is alcoholically amongst the lightest of wines, should have been saddled with the highest duty of any description [per gallon]. But so it was, until the year mentioned, when the Wine Duties were greatly simplified, a duty of 5s. 6d. per gallon being then levied on all foreign wine without discrimination, and 2s. 9d. on Cape Wine. In 1840, by the addition of 5 percent to the duties, the two rates became severally 2s. 10 13/2o d. and 5s. 9 6/2o d. and so remained until 1860.28 The French had long complained of the pernicious effects of the British tariff system on the French wine trade. Duties and excises on French alcohol to favor Portugal and Spain were initiated in 1667 and 1685 and had been augmented and refined since then, both to protect British beverage interests and to generate revenue.29 A French report to the Minister of Commerce in 1858 remarked that French wines had been the British drink of choice in the seventeenth century, but that the preferential tariff treatment of Portugal and Spain and the British investment on the Continent that followed had led to the French wines being displaced. French exports to Britain had barely changed in the last hundred years; they were less in the mid-1840s than they had been in the late 1600s; and British per capita wine consumption from all foreign countries had actually declined in the first half of the nineteenth century. Moreover, even after the tariffs on wine by volume were "equalized" in 1831, the French bore the brunt of the tariffs, because the average barrel (la piece) had a value of 300 or 400 francs whereas the Portuguese wines of higher alcoholic content were valued at 1,500 or even 2,000 francs.30 Other reports complained that the British were in the anomalous position relative to other nations (taking into consideration the domi- 27 The system whereby resident British merchants in foreign countries could organize as Factories with a measure of independence from the local authorities was well known in Portugal and Spain. These Factories were an important special interest in British trade policy, quick to respond to changes in commercial legislation and quick to lobby for change. For example, the large British communities of the Lisbon and Oporto Factories only became heavily involved in wine and spirits in the early 1700s, when the tariffs favoring Portugal and Spain over France came into effect. They quickly became important actors in the wine trade and worked to preserve and control the advantages they derived from that preferential treatment ( The section on spirits is equally revealing in that it explicitly discusses the problems of multiple discrimination employed in the British tariff system-with French products at one end, U.K. products at the other, and other foreign and colonial spirits in between. Foreign spirits, and especially French brandies, were either prohibited or taxed at a high rate to favor domestic and colonial spirits.34 Although rum from the colonies enjoyed protection vis-a-vis foreign spirits, colonial producers complained of being excluded by tariffs designed to protect local British (U.K.) products such as gin and whiskey.35 Protection of domestic and 3 Although the figures here are not precise, British and French observers agreed that French wine production constituted some 40 to 50 percent of the world's total and that France's representation in internationally traded wine was usually greater than this. Portuguese exports were overwhelmingly sent to the British market and were themselves an anomaly of British tariff policy. Thus French wine imports into Britain, at 5 percent of those from Spain and Portugal, were seen as virtually prohibitive by the French and some members of the British Parliament. Even given the tendency of wine to be a preferred source of customs and excise revenues, no other country in the world came close to having such an odd pattern of wine imports (AN F12 2525) . 32 Great Britain, Customs Tariffs. p. 156. 33 The French viticulteurs had long considered all drinks together and worried not only about the effects on their trade of the obvious substitutes such as sherry, port, or beer, but also about the growth in consumption of tea and coffee. After all, in the eighteenth century tea was as much a luxury as wine, though it had become the poor man's drink while wine remained an expensive luxury in the nineteenth century (France, AN F12 2484 and F12 2525) . In addition, to the extent that there is a "learned" component of the taste for beer or wine, British tariffs and excises helped form British tastes to the detriment of French wine during the period when rising incomes provided a new consumer base; this required several decades of lower prices to readjust. 34 Great Britain, Customs Tariffs, p. 166. Throughout the first half of the century, the report notes, "the high duty on brandy tended not only to restrict consumption of that article to a comparatively small quantity, but-which was far more serious-it encouraged smuggling to any extent which all the efforts of the customs authorities, and of the revenue cruisers failed to put down."
35 Ibid., pp. 167-68.
colonial producers extended further in the century than even the wine tariffs, which were substantially revised and lowered after the 1860 treaty; tariffs on spirits were even raised. As France was a major producer of both wine and spirits, all this customs activity would have seemed quite exclusionary regardless of the fiscal motivation.36 One group, however, did notice that there was a British double standard with respect to free trade: the protectionists. In the vigorous battles over the first attempt at major tariff reform in 1856, a number of writers denounced British unwillingness to lower the duties on wine and spirits while vigorously promoting free trade. Le Moniteur Industrielthe leading protectionist newspaper-editorialized as follows on its front page:
The wine-producing nations now know that they are the dupes in this great British market that should enrich them; they know that Great Britain will never sacrifice either their distilleries or their pubs for them. She [Britain] does not go so far in her devotion to the theories of free trade. From competition that she does not fear, she is willingly faithful [to free trade]. But free trade that touches her domestic production is another matter: she will hear none of it.
We have recently heard a story concerning these British tendencies, whose authenticity we guarantee. In Spain, as in France, the diplomats of liberalism have shamed the Spanish for their backward ideas regarding the protectionist system and have generously proposed establishing free trade between their two nations. Unfortunately, the Spanish asked if the free introduction of their wines was also included. They responded that that was a separate issue; that it touched too great a number of English interests; that Great Britain drew large revenues from her production of beer and of spirits; that these industries represented vast sums of capital, were the livelihood of masses of workers, and that England could never agree to make such a sacrifice on the altar of her principles. That is how the involved increased duties), the Chancellor of the Exchequer spoke of trying "to avoid extending a protective duty to the British manufacturer. "38 Yet on the average there was a "cover" to the British manufacturer (effective protection in making cigars) of 11 pence a pound; said cover was in practice an underestimate, established so that the laborers "who were employed in manufacture, amongst whom were women and children, might be well looked after."39 Sugar duties were not done away with until 1874. Before then British manufacture and British colonies had been well protected. Imports of raw sugar came almost exclusively from the West Indies before 1844, and refined sugar derived entirely from domestic British production. In 1844 raw sugar imports were opened up but protection was prolonged as a result of extraneous political concerns having to do with a bill designed to distinguish between free sugar and slave-produced sugar from foreign countries. After 1846 these distinctions were eliminated by Peel, but British refiners were protected until 1874.40 In the final analysis, the paradoxical gap between historical perception and commercial reality highlighted in this essay is explained by the observation that writers who talked about trade policy did not really consider the economy as a whole. For the thousandth time, it seems, scholars have confused the process of growth and development with industrialization most narrowly defined as a few areas of production: textiles, machinery, iron, and steel. mance of an economy than with the stellar characteristics of the more visible sectors.43 Leading sectors make for interesting metaphors, but swiftly rising values in areas that form only small parts of the economy do not explain overall changes in that economy. In much the same way uncritical analyses of trade policy that place a large and unspecified weight on duties levied on "essential" industrial products ignore the direct effects of high tariffs on other items. While it is possible to create models in which certain sectors of the economy provide important dynamic benefits that outweigh static losses in other sectors, these asymmetries are almost never empirically supported. Deadweight losses to the economy from tariffs on sugar, tea, and wine could outweigh losses from tariffs on cotton textiles, if textiles were a small part of one's trade.
None of this is meant to suggest that the move to free trade and its attendant political climate were unhelpful to growth. Undoubtedly the more open attitudes to trade did much to foster a more enlightened view of the role of market forces at home. There was some correlation between the interest in freer trade and the rise of a laissez-faire philosophy. Freer trade did have an impact on French industry, and Napoleon III's reforms did affect the structure of the French economy, though improved transportation, better capital markets, and overall economic liberalization played equal if not greater roles. In the final analysis, though the calculations in this article might be further refined and judgment vary regarding the historical effects of different trade policies, one thing is certain: the traditional stories of free trade counterposing a liberal Britain against a protectionist France, reluctantly dragged into a world of more enlightened commercial policies, must now be seen as false. Economic and political analyses that are motivated by the old stylized facts need to be re-examined accordingly. 
